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CHAPTER 6 
Contracts 
FREDERICK M. HART 
§6.I. General. The most important development of the decade 
in contract law has been the gradual acceptance of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Now, as over forty states have adopted the Code, 
another significant task is being undertaken: a revision of the Re-
statement of Contracts. A hurried reading of the first hundred-odd 
sections prompts a few general and tentative observations. 
It appears that the committee, which is headed by Harvard's Pro-
fessor Robert Braucher as Reporter, is attempting more than a simple 
updating of the original. Cases and statutes decided and enacted dur-
ing the past thirty years are responsible for some of the revisions but 
many more seem to emerge as the result of new thinking. The influ-
ence of Corbin, Fuller, Patterson, Kessler, Sharp, Dawson, and others 
is evident. Williston is still continually cited by the Reporter in his 
Notes, but even here there is change. Williston has been once revised 
by Thompson and is now undergoing a second revision by Professor 
Jaeger. 
The many changes being advocated belie the general feeling that 
Contracts is a dead subject. The number of alterations is more than 
might be expected, but none of the changes are surprising. It seems as 
though Restatement I has grown old gracefully and with comparatively 
little notice. 
§6.2. Building contracts: Damages. Two cases decided during the 
1965 SURVEY year appear to be simple applications of long-standing 
rules. Read separately they provoke little interest, but when they are 
compared a dissonant note is faintly audible. The cases involve, in 
somewhat different settings, a builder's right to compensation where he 
has failed to substantially perform a contract for the construction of 
a house. 
In Concannon v. Galanti1 'the defendant agreed to build a house 
for the plaintiff. The contract price was $17,800 and the lower court 
found that the house would have had a fair market value of $20,000 
had it been completed according to specifications. Owing to intentional 
deviations by the defendant, the cost of repairing defects was $5000 
and even after these were cured the value of the house would be only 
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$15,000. During the course of construction the plaintiff had paid 
$16,435 and given his note to the defendant for $1078, which repre-
sented the balance due under the contract less adjustments. In this 
action the plaintiff sued for damages caused by the faulty construction 
and· the defendant attempted to set off the amount of the unpaid 
note. 
The trial court granted the plaintiff judgment in the amount of 
$10,000 ($5000 to repair defects and $5000 diminution in value), and 
refused to allow the defendant's setoff "either because of failure of 
proof or because [the defendant] had intentionally deviated from the 
contract."2 Upon appeal the Supreme Judicial Court reduced the 
plaintiff's recovery by the amount of the note upon the rationale that 
the plaintiff "should have had a house worth $20,000 for a payment 
of $17,513.95" and that "they should not receive the equivalent of 
$20,000 for a payment of only $16,435."8 
This result appears fair and it is difficult to fault the Court's reason-
ing. The decision gives the plaintiff full compensation for his 
damages and the benefit that he would have received had the contract 
been fully performed, and yet the defendant is not penalized for his 
breach. Note, however, the case of S. Onorato Corp. v. Levin4 which 
also seems correctly decided. 
In the Onorato case the plaintiff agreed to build a house for the 
defendant, the price was $41,900, and work was to be completed on 
December 15th. After beginning construction the defendant had finan-
cial difficulties and only about half of the work was completed by the 
deadline. At the end of December the defendant ordered the plaintiff 
to discontinue work and a new builder was hired to complete the 
house. In this action the plaintiff sued for breach of contract and in 
quantum meruit for the labor and materials furnished but not paid 
for. The defendant counterclaimed alleging breach of contract. 
The lower court found that the plaintiff had furnished work and 
materials under the contract worth $1600 more than the defendant 
had paid during the course of construction, that the plaintiff also 
provided $1725 worth of extras for which the defendant had not paid, 
and that the defendant had not been damaged by the breach. The 
trial court denied recovery and this was affirmed by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. As to the quantum meruit count for work under the 
contract the Court held that there could be no recovery since there 
had not been substantial performance. The claim for extras was denied 
for the same reason on the theory that this claim became merged with 
the claim under the original contract. 
The Onorato case can be written off as a typical example of the 
substantial performance doctrine where the plaintiff has failed to 
bring himself within the exception. Technically, the case cannot be 
criticized. But, contrasting the Concannon case with Onorato, there 
2Id. at 1206, 202 N.E.2d at 237. 
8Id. at 1208, 202 N.E.2d at 238. 
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 205 N.E.2d 722. 
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does appear to be an inconsistency. In Concannon the builder in-
directly recovered the unpaid part of the contract price by receiving 
credit for the amount of the note. If he had sued on the note instead 
of raising it as a setoff, presumably he would have failed as the plain-
tiff in Onorato failed in his quantum meruit action. In Onorato the 
builder was refused recovery for materials and labor furnished even 
though his breach caused the homeowner no damage; in Concannon 
the homeowner's damages were adjusted by the unpaid balance. 
Even though a lawyer may explain and defend both decisions com-
petently by invoking doctrines of constructive conditions of exchange, 
substantial performance, and benefit of the bargain damages, logic 
questions and perhaps even rebels. It is submitted that the real or 
apparent inconsistency is caused by inherent deficiencies in the doc-
trine of constructive conditions of exchange as it is applied to con-
tracts that have been partially performed before a breach occurs. 
When one party to a bilateral contract has offered no performance 
it is common sense to prohibit his recovery on the contract and the 
judicially developed doctrine of conditions provides a useful rationali-
zation. When, however, a party has partially performed before his 
breach, he should be allowed to recover the value of his performance 
less any damages caused by the breach. Otherwise, there is a forfeiture. 
Penalizing the breaching party, even though society may applaud it 
as the just deserts of a "bad buy," serves no purpose in a civilized 
community of complicated commercial transactions. 
The Concannon case may be an indication of a slowly developing 
trend prophesied by Williston forty-five years ago: 
It seems probable that the tendency of decisions will favor a 
builder who has not unjustifiably abandoned his contract or been 
guilty of conscious moral fault in its performance.1i 
§6.3. Statute of frauds: Debts of another. A troublesome excep-
tion to the rule that promises to answer for the debt of another must 
be written is the "main purpose" rule. In Nelson v. Boynton,l Chief 
Justice Shaw expressed the rule in the following manner: 
Cases are not considered as coming within the statute when the 
party promising has for his object a benefit which he did not 
before enjoy, accruing immediately to himself; but where the 
object of the promise is to obtain the release of the person or 
property of the debtor, or other forbearance or benefit to him, it 
is within the statute.2 
Professor Simpson has criticized this and other statements of the rule 
as so vague that they provide "no forward step in certainty or predict-
Ii 3 Williston, Contracts §1475 (1st ed. 1920). See also 2 Restatement of Contracts 
§357 (1932). 
§6.3. 13 Met. 396 (Mass. 1841). 
2Id. at 402. 
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ability."3 Yet, neither he nor any other writer offers a more workable 
test. If predictability and reconcilability are to exist in this area they 
must be accomplished by the courts. 
Cases involving the main purpose rule are generally roughly classi-
fied according to fact patterns. One of the most common type of cases 
involves a promise made to a subcontractor. Hayes v. Guy,4 decided 
during the 1965 SURVEY year, is a typical example. 
In this case the defendant contracted with a general contractor for 
the construction of a house and the general contractor subcontracted 
with the plaintiff for the rough wiring. During the course of construc-
tion, the defendant ordered the plaintiff-subcontractor to change 
work from that originally specified. After the rough wiring was com-
pleted the defendant asked the plaintiff to connect the electrical 
service, a job not covered by the plaintiff's agreement with the general 
contractor. At this time the plaintiff was having difficulty collecting 
from the general contractor for the rough wiring and the defendant 
promised to pay not only for the connection of the service but also for 
the rough work. This action was brought by the plaintiff to collect 
for all of the work that he performed, including the rough wiring. 
The defendant prevailed in the trial court on plaintiff's claim for 
the rough wiring. This was reversed by the Appellate Division. On 
appeal by the defendant, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
Appellate Division, finding that the defendant's purpose in making 
the promise to pay for the rough wiring was to get the electrical service 
installed and that the discharge of the general contractor's debt was 
purely incidental. 
The case is a significant departure from the limited acceptance of 
the main purpose rule by this state in subcontractor cases. Although 
subcontractors in similar situations to the plaintiff in Hayes have re-
covered on a theory of novation5 and upon the somewhat ambiguous 
theory that the original contract had ended,6 this appears to be the 
first Massachusetts decision in which the main purpose rule has been 
applied in this type of case. 
The Court distinguished the case of Collins v. Abrams7 in which 
the pertinent facts were identical except for the form of the promise. 
In Hayes the defendant unqualifiedly promised to pay for the rough 
wiring while in Collins the promise by the defendant was that he 
"would see that the plaintiff was paid." The Court made much of this 
distinction stating that the language used by the defendant in Collins 
"indicates an intent that the defendant was only guaranteeing the 
payment of the debt of the general contractor."8 
The form of the promise should not be the only controlling factor. 
3 Simpson, Suretyship 139 (1950). 
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 543,205 N.E.2d 699. 
I> Slotnick v. Smith, 252 Mass. 303, 147 N.E. 737 (1925). 
6 Greenberg v. Weisman, 345 Mass. 700, 189 N.E.2d 531 (1963). 
7276 Mass. 106, 176 N.E. 814 (1931). 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 543, 546, 205 N.E.2d 699, 701. 
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It is only one indication of the intent or purpose of the promisor, 
and perhaps a weak one at that. Since the promise is oral, it is not 
likely to be carefully worded nor to be recalled at trial with complete 
accuracy. 
§6.4. Covenants not to compete. Discussed in the 1964 SURVEyl 
were two cases2 where the Supreme Judicial Court held that an im-
plied covenant not to compete attached to the sale of a business. In 
an unusual case decided during the 1965 SURVEY year, a seller main-
tained that an implied covenant should be imposed upon the buyer. 
In C. K. Smith &- Co. v. Charest8 the plaintiff and defendant corpo-
rations were competitors in the business of selling oil, installing oil 
burners, and in the general repair of heating equipment. During 1954 
the defendant sold his account's receivable to the plaintiff, and agreed 
to allow the plaintiff to use his business name and not to compete in 
the business of selling oil for five years. The individual defendant, who 
had been an employee prior to 1947 and was the president, treasurer, 
a director, and 99 per cent owner of the defendant corporation, agreed 
to work for the plaintiff and not to compete in the sale of oil for five 
years after the termination of his employment. 
From 1954 to .1961, the defendant corporation continued to service 
oil burners and occupied the same office as the plaintiff corporation. 
During this period, there was some disagreement over whether the 
oil customers who were formerly the defendant's customers should be 
furnished service and repairs by the plaintiff or the defendant corpo-
ration. These differences of opinion were not settled but they did not 
cause abandonment of the relationship between the parties. There was 
nothing in either the contract for the sale of the accounts or the con-
tract employing the individual defendant covering the question of 
who should do this repairing. 
In 1961, the corporate defendant and the individual defendant 
began to solicit customers of the plaintiff for the sale of oil. The 
plaintiff brought this action against the two defendants seeking 
damages from both and an injunction against the individual defend-
ant. The plaintiff was successful in both these requests and there was 
no appeal. The defendant had counterclaimed asking that the plaintiff 
be enjoined from competing for the service and repair business con-
nected with those accounts originally sold to the defendant. The trial 
court refused to grant the injunction and upon appeal this was af-
firmed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that it had found implied cove-
nants not to compete in both Tobin v. Cody4 and Caps Auto Parts, 
Inc. v. Caproni,rl even though the sales agreements were silent on the 
§6.4. 11964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§5.7, 6.1. 
2 Cap's Auto Parts. Inc. v. Caproni. 547 Mass. 211. 196 N.E.2d 874 (1964). and 
Tobin v. Cody. 545 Mass. 716. 180 N.E.2d 652 (1962). 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 55. 205 N.E.2d 565. 
41145 Mass. 716. 180 N.E.2d 652 (1962). 
rl547 Mass. 211. 196 N.E.2d 874 (1964). 
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question. Two connected reasons were given by the Court for not 
similarly implying a covenant in the present case. First, here a seller 
was arguing that a buyer had agreed not to compete in a related busi-
ness that was not a part of the sale whereas in the Tobin and Cap's 
cases it was the buyer who was attempting to enjoin the seller. The 
Court stated that it was more likely that a covenant would be under-
stood but unexpressed in the prior cases. Secondly, the Court noted 
that both parties had been represented by attorneys in the C. K. Smith 
case and that the negotiations were extensive. The Court concluded 
that it would be expected that they would have included such a 
covenant if this had been the agreement of the parties. 
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